
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		of great intere	by Marshal Tito in Zagreb on 2 est to the various political ele	ements in Belgrade.	

The reaction in these circles, as evidenced by comments me Belgrade, was generally as follows:

- Tito supporters: This group was elated by the speech because Tito cited the auspicious results of his foreign policy. Tito made it clear that he was successful in dispelling the suspicion and lack of faith which the United States had shown Yugoslavia in the past two years. He also succeeded in convincing American political leaders that the existence of a Communist Yugoslavia, independent of the Cominform, was in the interest and to the benefit of the United States. American leaders now feel assured that Yugoslavia is an internally stable and strong country, with a well-organized military machine, as opposed to the corrupt Yugoslav monarchy which existed before the war.
- 2. American politicians who visited Yugoslavia recently have confirmed Tito's opinions in comments which they made to Yugoslav officials and to the press. The assistance which the United States has offered Yugoslavia in her current economic crisis is without ties or conditions, and Yugoslavia has not been asked to make any changes in her internal politics. This has raised considerably the prestige and reputation of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party and, specifically, of Tito.
- 3. Cominformists: The Cominformists consider Tito's speech as a clear and irrefutable indication of the regime's rapprochement with the Western capitalist powers. The entire speech was of definite anti-Soviet character and, in their orinion, it did not present the true situation to the Yugoslav people who still feel indebted to the Soviets for their liberation.
- 4. Non-Communist groups: Primarily, these groups are satisfied and in accord with America's offer of aid in the present crisis. The aid will definitely draw Tito away from the Soviet Union, but it is not believed that, in so doing, it will bring Tito any closer to the West.
- 5. The threats made by the regime to "reactionaries" in Yugoslavia are considered completely unjustified, because Yugoslav political opposition groups made no attempts to induce America to exert pressure on the regime or ask for concessions



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in exchange for economic assistance. If any such attempts were made, they were sponsored by political groups in exile or by the Vatican through Catholic circles. Tito's unwarranted threats have aroused the ire of all non-Communist circles in the country.

- 6. Non-Communists found it most difficult to accept that part of Tito's speech in which he stated that American leaders confirmed his conviction that a strong, consolidated, socialist Yugoslavia renders greater service to Western interests than the listless Yugoslavia which existed before the war. These words have made the people more despondent than ever and, according to these circles, they will never be willing to accept the Communist regime.
- 7. The people are opposed to Bolshevik Russia and Tito, and they favor the Western democracies, especially the United States. They look to the United States, however, to free them from the Communist regime and not to strengthen it which, they feel, has been the result of the entire American political effort recently. The Yugoslav people feel that America is a contributing factor in prolonging the existence of Tito's regime, and they are disheartened and confused by this turn of events.

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